In the days after October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched its deadly attacks on Israel, hundreds of thousands of Israeli reservists up-ended their lives to answer the call.
People abandoned holidays and honeymoons, left their jobs and studies abroad and scrambled to get flights back to Israel.
In some units, the turnout rate reached up to 150 per cent, with many reservists showing up for duty despite not receiving formal orders to do so.
One of those was Jonathan Kadmon, who served as a medic in Gaza during the first three months of the war.
"I'm not a big fan of the IDF, but after October 7, I think it's one of the very few times that I took my uniform and I heartfully and purposely knew where I was going," he told the ABC.
"And that's because of those attacks of October 7, and the fact that [Hamas] had, at the time, about 250 hostages."
Having served in Gaza in 2008 and 2014, Mr Kadmon had some idea what to expect — but was still shocked by the scale of the destruction.
"We knew the place would be ruined, but I think it's still very different to walk the scorched earth and the streets of this ruined city," he said.
"I understand the operational need for it, because we have hostages inside … [but] you also hope that someone is factoring in the collateral damage.
"And when you start to see destruction, you start to make your own calculations — is this amount of destruction really necessary?"
As the war dragged on, Mr Kadmon's views shifted significantly, and he decided he could no longer serve in a war he believed was being fought for the wrong reasons.
"I think I feel the way that most of the public feel this at the moment, which is it's not needed and this is being done for political reasons," he said.
"And the political reason is the self-preservation of the Netanyahu government which is being extorted by the right wing, the extremist right wing, [National Security Minister Itamar] Ben-Gvir and [Finance Minister Bezalel] Smotrich."
Fellow reservist Dana, who didn't want to use her last name because she has been serving in the defence intelligence division, said her views had also changed over the course of the war.
She was overseas when the October 7 attacks happened and quickly rushed to return to Israel.
"In the beginning of the war I was proactively trying to do more," she told the ABC.
"For a lot of people, the most overwhelming feeling was a grave feeling of helplessness, and being proactive made you feel less passive. There was a collective shock, and not doing anything made you feel helpless."
She said while she is not generally pro-war, she initially saw this conflict as a "just war".
"I'm not an idealistic person, I'm a realistic person, and there was a need to react … especially after such brutality," she said.
Earlier this year, after Israel broke the most recent ceasefire, Dana decided she could no longer continue to be an IDF reservist.
She now believes a deal is the only option.
"Israel has the mindset [that] they cannot lose the war, because then they would lose the country," she said.
"But anyone who's talking about winning the war is a bit out of touch with reality. Israel lost the war on October 7, what needs to be done now is to cut losses."
Their views reflect a widespread mood shift among many Israeli reservists and soldiers, just as Israel calls up 60,000 reservists as part of its campaign to take over Gaza City.
In April, thousands of reservists signed letters demanding that the government stop the fighting and instead focus on reaching a deal to bring back the hostages being held in Gaza.
Last June, 41 officers and reservists sent a letter to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defence Minister Israel Katz accusing the government of waging an "unnecessary, eternal war" in Gaza and announcing they would no longer take part in it.
According to Israel's national broadcaster Kan, only 60 per cent of soldiers are now showing up for reserve duty — roughly half of the 120 per cent recorded in the early days of the war.
"They're voting with their feet by not going," Mr Kadmon said.
"We have people who've been incarcerated or detained for not showing up or refusing … and I don't see anything the government is doing to convince them."
The IDF told the ABC it saw "great importance" in reserve service, adding that each case of absence or refusal would be examined and handled on its own merits by commanders.
"In this challenging security reality, the contribution of the reservists is essential to the success of missions and to maintaining the security of the country," the IDF said in a statement.
A growing rift between the IDF and government
It's not just the rank and file where there's an increasing opposition to the conflict.
Dissent is also growing in the upper echelons of the IDF.
As Israel's military begins what could be the most dangerous phase of the war yet, tensions between its leadership and the Netanyahu government have hit an all-time high.
After reportedly pushing back against a plan to expand the war and conquer Gaza City, the Israeli military's chief of staff, Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, has since approved the government's general outline for the offensive.
But there's growing speculation he may not be around to lead it.
According to multiple media reports, General Zamir — who was hand-picked by Mr Netanyahu less than six months ago — was concerned about the exhaustion and fitness of reservists, and feared such an offensive would risk the lives of the Israeli hostages.
Despite these concerns, the Netanyahu government's security cabinet approved the plan anyway.
General Zamir defended what he described as a "culture of debate" within the military, releasing a statement which read:
"We will continue to express our position without fear — in a matter-of-fact, independent and professional manner … Here lies the responsibility, at this very table."
But his appetite for debate has drawn the ire of several members of Mr Netanyahu's cabinet, including Mr Katz and Mr Ben-Gvir.
After he selected more than 20 officers for promotion without having first consulted Mr Katz, that rift intensified.
Mr Katz accused General Zamir of consulting with former officials and other outsiders opposed to the Netanyahu government, with the far-right minister Mr Ben-Gvir saying that if the general continued to do so, he "needs to be fired".
Benjamin Netanyahu's son Yari also publicly accused him of "mutiny", and of leading a "coup and rebellion" against his father.
Those developments came after 19 former defence chiefs issued a joint video message calling for an end to the war in Gaza.
In the video, the group of retired IDF chiefs of staff, intelligence chiefs, Shin Bet and Mossad directors and police commissioners argued that Israel has suffered more losses than victories, and that the war was dragging on for political reasons rather than military ones.
Professor Yagil Levy from the Open University of Israel described the current situation in The Guardian as the "most severe crisis in the history of relations between the political echelon and the military since the 1948 war".
"Never before has the political leadership compelled the military to execute an operation it adamantly opposed," he said.
A long list of resignations and firings
There's increasing speculation the Israeli military's top commander could be the latest high-profile departure from the country's military and intelligence leadership since the October 7 attacks.
Throughout the conflict, Mr Netanyahu has repeatedly clashed with generals and security chiefs over their handling of the war, leaving a trail of resignations and sackings.
[timeline]In April 2024, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, Major General Aharon Haliva, was the first senior official to resign over the failure to prevent the October 7 attacks.
Two months later, Brigadier General Avi Rosenfeld, the commander of the Gaza Division, also resigned, citing a failure to protect military bases and communities at the time.
In July that year, the head of domestic intelligence agency Shin Bet's Southern District quit his position too, saying he felt "a personal and moral obligation to ask for forgiveness from all those whose loved ones were murdered, whose children fell in battle, who were taken hostage and returned to Israel and those who are still held in captivity by the enemy".
A month later, Brigadier General Yossi Sariel from Unit 8200 and an intelligence officer in the Gaza division both resigned over intelligence failures on October 7.
In November 2024, then-defence minister Yoav Gallant was fired by Mr Netanyahu, citing a "crisis of trust" over the war. He had long called for a public inquiry into the October 7 failures.
In January this year, the Head of the Southern Command, Major General Yaron Finkelman, announced his resignation, alongside IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi — citing the "terrible failure" of security and intelligence related to Hamas's attack.
In March, Major General Oded Basiuk, chief of the IDF's Operations Directorate, resigned after an investigation into October 7 failures. IDF spokesman Daniel Hagari also retired from the military — a move widely seen as a dismissal.
That same month, Ronen Bar, the head of intelligence agency Shin Bet, tendered his resignation after weeks of tension with Mr Netanyahu, citing personal responsibility for the agency's failure to prevent the October 7 attacks.
Over 22 months, a string of senior officials have taken responsibility for the failings that led to October 7.
Notably absent is Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Critics of Mr Netanyahu argue he's deliberately prolonging the war — and the return of the hostages — in order to preserve his coalition and stay in power, primarily to avoid facing his long-running corruption trials.
They say that in doing so, he is prioritising his own political survival over the actual survival of IDF personnel, the hostages and Palestinian civilians.
The next phase of the war promises to be dangerous and deadly, and General Zamir is not alone in questioning its military objective.
Much of Hamas's senior leadership has been wiped out and it is now using guerilla-style tactics, adding to the risk of an expanded campaign in an urban environment like Gaza City.
As Ian Parmeter from the ANU's Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies writes in The Conversation:
"Hamas will be able to use its vast tunnel network to mount surprise attacks on Israeli soldiers and place booby-traps in buildings. As such, Netanyahu's plan will inevitably lead to more IDF casualties.
"Moreover, taking full control of the strip would take months to complete and lead to countless more Palestinian civilian deaths."
With a dwindling number of reservists willing to return to Gaza, there are major questions about whether Israel even has the ability to carry out such an operation.
