Jennifer Mathers, Senior Lecturer in International Politics, Aberystwyth University
Whether the various peace plans now under discussion bring an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine will depend largely on security guarantees. But securing an agreement between Ukraine, its allies and Russia about how Ukraine’s future security will be assured may prove to be the most difficult part of any peace deal.
Ukraine already has bitter experience of what happens when a security guarantee turns out to be no guarantee at all.
Back in 1994, Ukraine reluctantly put its faith in the vague assurances of the Budapest memorandum. According to the terms of that agreement, Ukraine gave up the Soviet-era nuclear weapons stationed on its territory and pledged to sign the non-proliferation treaty and remain a non-nuclear country.
In exchange, Russia, Britain and the US promised to respect the independence, sovereignty and borders of Ukraine and not to use force against that country.
But the only commitments that Moscow, London and Washington made was to seek action by the UN security council to support Ukraine – and then only if Ukraine were attacked or threatened with attack by nuclear weapons. The memorandum made no mention of what should happen if Ukraine faced an attack using conventional forces.
As Ukraine’s then-president, Leonid Kuchma, remarked after the deal was done: “If tomorrow Russia goes into Crimea, no one will raise an eyebrow.”
Twenty years later, Kuchma’s prediction came true. In 2014, Russian troops occupied strategic points in Crimea. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, then engineered a widely discredited referendum on the region’s future status and claimed it as part of the territory of the Russian Federation.
Russia went on to arm, fund and direct local militias in eastern Ukraine and covertly sent its own soldiers to fight with them to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty.
Britain and the US – among other western countries – imposed economic sanctions on Russia and provided training, funding and supplies to the Ukrainian armed forces. This material support accelerated rapidly after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. But these measures have not stopped Russia’s aggression or guaranteed Ukraine’s security.
Now, as the full-scale conflict in Ukraine nears its fourth anniversary, the success of a new set of peace deals will, in large part, hinge on whether Kyiv can rely on its allies to come to the rescue if Russia decides to resume hostilities at some future stage.
Empty promises
In 2023, former US president Bill Clinton expressed his regrets at his role in the Budapest Memorandum. He revealed that back in 2011 Putin had told him that Russia’s leaders did not consider themselves to be bound by the agreement.
In the 1990s, Ukraine’s leaders had a variety of reasons for actively choosing to relinquish nuclear weapons. These included the promise of much-needed economic assistance from the west and the Ukrainians’ own experience of the devastating impact of nuclear technology in the shape of the 1986 Chernobyl accident.
Read more: Thirty years ago, Ukrainians got rid of their nuclear arsenal – now most of them regret that decision
There was also a strong consensus in Ukrainian society in favour of non-nuclear status. But recently released archival documents demonstrate that the country’s leaders had serious reservations about how Ukraine’s security would be ensured after nuclear weapons were removed from its territory.
The Budapest Memorandum is an example of an agreement shaped by short-term considerations with long-term consequences very different from the ones that at least some of the signatories anticipated. Western countries, led by the US, were focused on confining the thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons to one country to reduce the chances that they might end up in the hands of terrorist groups or rogue states.
In the mid 1990s any future threat that Russia might pose to Ukraine was outweighed in the eyes of the west by two other considerations. The first was optimism that Russia would develop into a democracy and become a partner rather than an adversary.
The second was that Russia was too weak to pose a threat in the foreseeable future. The absence of genuine security guarantees in the Budapest agreement, therefore, reflected the predominant view in the west that pledges of good will would be sufficient to protect Ukraine.
Hard choices for Zelensky
With this history in mind and faced with the prospect of having to agree to a negotiated settlement, the Ukrainian president, Volodymr Zelensky, has been insistent that Ukraine will only be truly secure inside Nato. Opposition to Nato membership for Ukraine from Russia – but also from several members of the alliance, especially the US – has led the Ukrainians and their allies to search for alternatives.
Read more: Any peace deal in Ukraine must be just and fair – the plan proposed by the US and Russia was neither
The “coalition of the willing” – a group of countries supporting Ukraine including the UK, various European nations, Canada and Turkey – have indicated their willingness to provide forces in the air, at sea and even on the ground to deter further aggression. But the plan for a multilateral peacekeeping force relies on the participation of the US for much of its credibility.
It’s not clear whether Washington will be willing to provide such assurances. Previously the Trump administration has played down any commitment to providing security guarantees for Ukraine.
For Russia, on the contrary, the Budapest Memorandum appears to be the precedent that it is following in crafting security assurances for Ukraine. The peace plan currently under discussion – which we now know that Russian official Kirill Dmitriev had a large role in drafting – offers only a bland assurance that Ukraine would receive reliable security guarantees.
At the same time it imposes a limit on the size of Ukraine’s armed forces. It also prevents it from joining Nato and bans the troops of Nato member states on its territory. All of which would severely undermine Ukraine’s security.
As a result, each of the interested parties have very different views about the nature of security guarantees that would be sufficient. Ukraine is pushing for Nato membership. Russia is vehemently opposed. The Europeans are trying to find a pragmatic halfway house. The Trump administration is reluctant to commit American resources to much of anything.
The chances a negotiated settlement to this war will be reached quickly or easily by negotiations remain remote, at best.
Jennifer Mathers does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
